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Understanding energy transitions: the changing versions of the modern 
infrastructure ideal and the ‘energy underclass’ in South Africa, 1860-2019 
 
Abstract  
There is increasing recognition that the prospects of a post-networked city 
challenges the myth of the modernist ideal of a networked city and offers a more 
realistic proposition for energy transitions in the global south. This paper examines 
the energy transitions involved in the development of South Africa’s versions of the 
modern infrastructural ideal for electricity provision since the nineteenth century. 
Four phases of South Africa’s energy transition are identified, consisting of colonial, 
apartheid, post-apartheid and low-carbon phases. The paper argues that the 
agendas influencing the generation, distribution and consumption of electricity in 
South Africa are multiple and potentially conflicting, which are emblematic of the 
limitations of the modern infrastructure ideal, particularly in relation to the formation 
of an ‘energy underclass’. Recognition and consideration of the potential uneven and 
differentiated spatial effects of energy transitions will continue to be integral to the 
planning and management of any transformations towards a post-networked city.  
 
Highlights:  
- Insights into how technological and urban models function within specific 
places 
- Agendas influencing electricity in South Africa are multiple and conflicting 
- Energy transitions create new uneven spatial effects within society.  
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Understanding energy transitions: the changing versions of the modern 
infrastructure ideal and the ‘energy underclass’ in South Africa, 1860-2019 
 
1. Introduction 
Human development is closely interlinked with energy and the relationships between 
people and energy have taken several forms over the centuries moving from 
traditional energy sources to modern fuels, and from fossil-fuel driven energy 
systems towards less polluting ones (Grubb, et al., 2008). Ever since the first 
transition from traditional energy sources to modern energy sources, electricity has 
taken a central role in energy transitions. In the global north, standardised, 
centralised, homogeneous and near universal electricity networks were established 
to distribute energy, usually delivered by a monopolistic (and often state-led public 
utility) provider as a ‘public good’ in a period of industrial growth. These networks 
have become known as the modern infrastructure ideal (Furlong, 2014) and 
represent the modernist ideal of a networked city (Monstadt and Schramm, 2017, 
p.106; Lawhon, et al., 2013).  
 
Many countries in the global south have aspired and made progress towards this 
same modern infrastructural ideal in their efforts to supply the millions of urban 
citizens who lack access to affordable and reliable energy services. However, this 
conventional networked model has proved to be ill-suited to meeting the energy 
demands of cities in the global south. Rapid urban and population growth, often onto 
private land at the edge of cities, has highlighted the technical, financial and legal 
limits of an energy system based on a networked grid. The capacity of public utility 
institutions to extend the network is constrained by the skills of its workforce, 
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regulatory legislation, institutional structures and inertia, as well as by issues of 
economic viability, where infrastructural investment requires at least some cost-
recovery from its potential users. The outcomes from such a networked energy 
distribution system is often characterised by an unequal, unreliable and rationed 
service (Jaglin, 2014), with place-based creativity and pragmatism providing 
adaptation, appropriation, hybridisation and refusal of the ideal to meet the real 
energy needs and preferences of local residents (Monstadt and Schramm, 2017, 
p.121). 
 
The emergence of post-networked or off-network cities, characterised by 
heterogeneous and informal infrastructural provision, such as small-scale embedded 
renewable energy generation, offer an alternative delivery model and a ‘pragmatic 
turn’ to improve access to essential services for the growing populations of cities in 
the global south (Jaglin, 2015). While alternative models of energy generation and 
distribution have been associated with meeting the basic living needs of the urban 
poor, there is an equally significant demand from the rise of the middle classes in the 
global south, who wish to secure a reliable energy supply from new technologies to 
meet their social aspirations and status. The emergence of a post-/heterogeneous 
networked city not only challenges the myth of the modernist ideal of a 
homogeneous networked city, but potentially offers a more realistic proposition for 
energy transitions in the global south. As noted by Jaglin (2015, p.189), the 
challenge is “… not so much to do with employing these technologies as with 
embedding them in appropriate and durable socio-technical systems”. 
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The local and international conditions within which these transitions are taking place 
are changing, especially given the urgency to tackle climate change and the 
emergence of alternatives to fossil fuels. While current energy systems have become 
unsustainable on social, economic and environmental criteria (Grubler, 2012), 
contemporary energy transitions have become intertwined with numerous competing 
agendas, which can create trade-offs between growth, equity and sustainability 
(Patel, 2006). The ability of emerging energy systems to generate sufficient power at 
a competitive price for economic growth while, at the same time, distribute it in an 
equitable and affordable way and develop clean energy sources to mitigate against 
climate change present considerable challenges, especially for countries in the 
global south. 
 
These challenges are encapsulated in Cock’s (2004) conceptual framework of 
environmental justice, which emphasises the relative importance of the ‘red’, ‘brown’ 
and ‘green’ agendas. First, the brown agenda refers to the role of energy in 
establishing the basics of quality of life, including livelihoods, public health, 
sanitation, well-being and poverty alleviation strategies (Freund, 2001; Khan, 2014). 
Second, the red agenda concerns itself with matters of social justice and equality of 
opportunity within the population and so focuses on the access and affordability of 
energy supply to all groups within society (Cock, 2004). Third, the green agenda of 
ecologically sustainable development focuses on ecosystem protection, mitigation of 
further degradation of natural resources, inter-generational equity and environmental 
justice from energy generation and distribution (Bolnick et al., 2006). In the context of 
energy provision, these agendas translate into access to affordable energy services 
for the brown agenda, access that is just and equitable for the red agenda and the 
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use of clean, environmentally benign energy for the green agenda. The achievement 
of all three agendas at the same time is challenging, especially given the potentially 
competing nature of some of the goals. For example, the production of cheap power 
for economic growth and/or universal access for all groups in society does not 
necessarily mean that the distribution will be affordable or clean. Environmentally 
benign energy might increase the prospect of limits on generation and/or higher 
costs, which might then limit access and/or affordability and constrain economic 
growth. Indeed, these relationships between these agendas might be made more 
complex in the countries of the global south, where historical legacies and influences 
have created ingrained cultural norms related, for example, to colonial rule, or the 
response to colonial rule. Some agendas might be privileged over others, with 
concomitant effects on the extent and character of the energy provision and groups 
that might be identified as the ‘energy underclass’. 
 
This paper examines the energy transitions involved in the development of South 
Africa’s versions of the modern infrastructural ideal for electricity provision since the 
nineteenth century, with particular emphasis of the balance of the brown, red and 
green agendas within policy discourses. By adopting a historical perspective on 
energy transitions, it is possible to identify patterns, dynamics and drivers of past 
shifts which have relevance to contemporary policy formulation (Grubler, 2012, p.8). 
As the leading African economy, South Africa is seen as a ‘front-runner’ and model 
for the prospect of ‘rolling out’ the latest version of the modern infrastructural ideal for 
the rest of the continent. As a result of its apartheid legacies, access to power 
supplies is inequitable and deep-rooted, which is replicated in different guises in 
many other African countries. In post-apartheid South Africa, the country has 
8 
 
adopted a pro-poor policy towards energy access and affordability, which has 
produced many benefits for its population, although much of this capacity is based 
on polluting fossil fuels. The country has signed up to obligations related to 
international climate change agreements, which has begun to develop its capacity in 
clean renewable energy. Despite these progressive developments, inequitable 
access to modern energy sources remains and the prospect of more decentralised 
renewable energy as part of the post-networked city has the potential to undermine 
the country’s pro-poor principles. In order to clarify the form of future energy 
transitions, there is a need for a much better understanding of the ways in which 
energy systems were shaped in the past so that the origins and underlying causes of 
apparent contemporary obstacles and impediments can be identified. This paper 
contributes to the literature on energy transitions in that the analysis will help to 
better understand the emergence of South Africa’s energy transitions in the past in 
becoming pro-poor, ecologically sustainable and equitably distributed. The 
discussion partly addresses Monstadt and Schramm’s (2017, p.122) call for planning 
research and practice to address how technological and urban models function 
within specific places and infrastructural domains. In addition, by understanding the 
changing energy underclass, the needs of this large group of energy users might be 
better addressed.  
 
Four broad, but distinct, chronological phases of energy provision in South Africa are 
presented and analysed, which form the basis and structure of the discussion: the 
limited spatial extent of the supply infrastructure in the colonial period (1860-1948); 
the highly segregated supply of the Apartheid period (1948-1994); the more 
equitable and pro-poor emphasis of the post-Apartheid era (1994-2011); and the so 
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far unknown effects of a sustainable energy transition (2011-) (Table 1). Using 
Cock’s (2004) conceptual framework of environmental justice, the relative 
importance of the ‘red’, ‘brown’ and ‘green’ agendas in each of these phases of the 
energy transition is analysed in relation to the inherent potential conflicts between 
the agendas and the effect on the extent of the ‘energy underclass’. The paper 
argues that recognition of the potential uneven and differentiated urban spatial 
effects of a sustainable energy transition will continue to be integral to the planning 
and management of such transformations in South African cities. These have wider 
implications for energy in the African continent. 
 
2. Phase I: The emergence of South Africa’s electricity network in colonial 
South Africa (1860-1948) 
The emergence of an electricity network in South Africa from the late nineteenth 
century was heavily influenced by two dominant political factors: the minerals-energy 
complex (MEC) and the apartheid regime. The MEC is a ‘core set of industrial 
sectors which exhibit very strong linkages between each other and relatively weak 
linkages with other sectors’ (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996, p. 91). The MEC in South 
Africa is dominated by minerals and mining companies (together with its associated 
institutions) and lies at the core of the South African economy. It is not merely a ‘core 
set of industries and institutions but also a system of accumulation’ (Fine and 
Rustomjee, 1996, p. 10). The need for cheap electricity, based on low-grade 
domestic coal reserves mined in Mpumalanga, Limpopo, Kwazulu-Natal and the 
Free State, was a driving principle for the foundation of the South African economy 
at this time. 
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At the end of the nineteenth century, private electricity generation companies, 
usually associated with the growth of diamond and gold mining across the country, 
established mining towns equipped with local electricity grids (Gentle, 2009). Some 
of these operators, such as the Victoria Falls and Transvaal Power Company, were 
substantial and powerful industrial players and formed the basis of the emerging 
MEC (Jaglin and Dubresson, 2016, p.10). Urban municipalities also began to 
generate their own electricity to light public spaces as part of their public duties, 
which subsequently stimulated demand for electrical supply in retail businesses and 
then residential properties within (or in close proximity to) town and city centres. 
However, after the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, the creation of an 
integrated system of electricity generation and transmission regulated by 
government to supply cheap power for mining, manufacturing and the railways 
became a priority (Gentle, 2009, p.56), and was arguably a fundamental and 
symbolic component of the country’s ‘nation building’ by consolidating Afrikaner 
politico-economic power over British interests (Jaglin and Dubresson, 2016, p. 11). 
 
By the 1920s, the Afrikaner government seized control of the electricity sector to 
promote its political and economic vision. The production of a stable, plentiful and 
cheap supply of electricity was required to facilitate state capitalism by the expansion 
of the MEC and the development of manufacturing (Jaglin and Dubresson, 2016, 
p.9-11). The mining sector, in particular, required cheap power to offset the 
increasing costs of exploiting more inaccessible and lower quality deposits. The 
same principle applied to the creation of cheap labour for the mining sector in the 
form of the compound labour system, which later became intrinsically associated 
with racial segregation and apartheid in the interests of wealth creation for the white 
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population (Gentle, 2009, p.53). Thus, the nationalisation of electricity and urban 
segregation became essential features of the state’s development strategy, which 
were to define the ‘energy underclass’ in the apartheid period. 
 
The generation of electricity was nationalised in the Electricity Act No. 42 of 1922. 
The Electricity Supply Commission (Escom, or in Afrikaans, 
Elektrisiteitsvoorsieningskommissie, Evhom) was formed on 6 March, 1923, which 
subordinated supplies to one Electricity Control Board and compelled all electricity 
users to obtain their supplies through this Board (Christie, 1984). The creation of 
Escom signified the formation of the South African national grid.  According to Jaglin 
and Dubresson (2016, p.14), through the creation of Escom and the national grid, 
the government had acquired “…an instrument of control essential to the fulfilment of 
a political regime that has been described by some as racial Keynesian 
capitalism …, by others as racial Fordism”. Escom’s capability to produce cheap 
electricity from coal was facilitated by a level of autonomy that protected it from shifts 
in the ruling party, and by an unerring faith and legitimacy based in the technical and 
professional competence of its engineers. Escom could therefore implement the 
network with minimal political intervention, which enabled the task to be an exercise 
based on its technical competence rather than on political negotiation. Jaglin and 
Dubresson (2016, p.16) use the term ‘controlled technopolitics’ to describe “the 
deliberate use of knowledge and technical choices to promote a socio-political vision 
aligned with that of government”. While municipalities continued to generate some 
electricity, it was controlled centrally by Escom tied to the political regime of 
apartheid. Despite changing political, socio-economic and environmental agendas 
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indicated in the following phases, the reputation of Escom based on its technical 
prowess remained strong until the 2000s.  
 
The energy underclass during this first phase consisted of the majority of the 
population, as electricity was only provided in a few pockets across the country. The 
MEC shaped an energy system to service mining and industrial activities, and most 
South African households were unelectrified. The energy underclass, therefore, 
consisted of the majority of South Africa’s population as only mining towns and a few 
privileged households benefited from electricity. During this period, the green, brown 
and red agendas had no relevance to energy planning and decision-making.  
 
3. Phase II - Electricity under Apartheid, 1948-1994 
With the election of the National Party in 1948, the apartheid regime was introduced, 
which created segregation, spatial inequality, exclusion and marginalisation in order 
to create cheap pools of labour to facilitate industrial growth (Beall, et al., 2000). 
There were two pieces of legislation that defined the Grand Apartheid period (1950-
1994). First, the Population Registration Act of 1950 formalised a racial classification 
of four groups (whites, coloureds, Asians and Natives) and the introduction of identity 
cards. Second, the Group Areas Act of 1950 defined the racial composition of every 
residential area and required forced removals for anyone who did not comply (Field, 
2001). During the apartheid era, neighbourhoods were designated with specific 
‘Black, Indian and Coloured’ designations (Turok, 2014; Crankshaw et al., 2000; 
Lemanski, 2009). These areas were located at the urban periphery in so called 
‘townships’ or, for rural areas, ‘homelands’. Furthermore, these settlements were 
poorly or not serviced by the municipalities. Due to the exclusionary apartheid 
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policies, less than a third of self-built housing and informal settlements in townships 
had electricity connections (Beall et al., 2000; Louw et al., 2008; Lloyd et al., 2004). 
As a result, most South Africans were forced to rely on polluting and inefficient fuels 
to meet their energy needs.  
 
Apartheid’s political regime created a rather distorted version of the modern 
infrastructural ideal, whereby ‘universal’ electricity was supplied to white areas only. 
A very large, racially determined, energy underclass, which consisted of the majority 
of the non-white population, did not have access to modern energy. Electricity itself 
had become “…an instrument of discrimination, employed in the complex task of 
managing the relations between the government and human groups ordered into 
‘races’ and assigned unequal statuses and rights” (Jaglin and Dubresson, 2016, 
p.17). As a consequence, these circumstances were the antithesis of the brown or 
red agendas. Similarly, the green agenda did not emerge until the end of the 
Apartheid era, when concern about the environmental impacts of energy systems 
began to be raised (Van Horen et al., 1993). The legacy of this politicised system of 
service provision is that, despite the end of apartheid, it continues to influence the 
way in which urban spaces and energy infrastructure are shaped today. 
 
4. Phase III: Electricity in the Post-apartheid era, 1994-2011 
With the end of Apartheid in 1994, the African National Congress’s (ANC) 
Reconstruction and Development Programme focused on rebuilding the country’s 
economy, while bridging the gap between the rich and the poor (Mohlakoana, 2014). 
Electricity was central to this vision, because it was perceived as a convenient, 
modern fuel able to reduce indoor air pollution and related negative health impacts 
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(from open fires and paraffin) as well as fire risks. Moreover, electricity supply was 
seen as key to the creation of business opportunities and creating a better life for its 
citizens. The heavy focus on South Africa’s post-apartheid government on equality 
and redress resulted in the pursuing of a very strong brown and red agenda in its 
energy policy and planning, with the green agenda remaining largely absent.  
 
The advent of a constitutional democracy in South Africa at the end of apartheid 
brought a shift in the responsibilities of municipalities. Municipalities became an 
independent tier of government with autonomous powers, subject to constitutional 
constraint, which was now seen as having an important social inclusion and 
development role for communities. In particular, municipalities became responsible 
for the distribution or reticulation of electricity to the majority of their populations in a 
sustainable manner (Mosdell, 2016). To illustrate, Eskom generates 96 per cent of 
the country’s electricity and continued to distribute about 60 per cent, mainly to rural 
areas (including the former Homelands) and some parts of cities. The remaining 40 
per cent of electricity is distributed by the municipalities. Municipalities purchase their 
electricity from Eskom, but reap significant profits from on-selling. The distribution of 
electricity plays an important role in maintaining the viability of municipalities and 
their public services, especially pro-poor energy schemes.  
 
After 1994, the modern infrastructural ideal was extended to all population groups 
through an ambitious electrification programme by Eskom, working with 
municipalities and the Department of Energy. A target to connect 2.5m households 
by 2000 was set and achieved (Mohlakoana, 2014, p.29). Between 1991 and 2005, 
about 4.9 million households were provided with an electricity supply, with 3.2 million 
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connected by Eskom and 1.7 million connected by local government (Greenberg, 
2009, p.89). In 1996, 58.2 per cent of households in South Africa had access to 
electricity for lighting. By 2011, this figure had risen to 85 per cent, which was 
considered internationally as a remarkable achievement (Table 2).  
 
A key factor for Eskom in extending the electricity supply to all households, and so 
move towards a modern infrastructural ideal for all, was the introduction of pre-
payment meters. While metering has been linked to the perpetuation of inequalities 
based on the ability to pay and for introducing strains on households to limit 
consumption and expenditure on electricity (Makonese et al., 2012), the technology 
did provide the means by which Eskom and municipalities could recover the costs of 
universal access to electricity in areas where the billing of households without 
addresses was virtually impossible (McDonald, 2009; van Heusden, 2009).  The 
introduction of pre-payment meters by Eskom has also allowed households, 
especially in townships and rural areas, to manage their energy consumption and 
bills more effectively. Under the New Household Electrification Strategy (2013), 
universal provision is now set to be achieved by 2030, although with population 
growth and the continued expansion of informal settlements, this target is a moving 
one.  
 
The increase in the use of electricity within the population after 1994 was substantial 
(Table 2). In terms of energy for lighting, electricity use rose from 57.6 per cent in 
1996 to 69.7 per cent in 2001 and 84.7 per cent in 2011. Electricity use for heating 
increased from 44.5 per cent in 1996 to 58.8 per cent in 2011, while electricity for 
cooking grew from 47.1 per cent in 1996 to 73.9 per cent in 2011. Although natural 
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gas use also increased marginally, all other energy forms declined absolutely and 
proportionally despite substantial increases in population numbers from inward 
migration. Nevertheless, there remain 3.4 million households without electricity.  
In the urban context, the populations in this situation are mostly those in informal 
settlements as their informal status inhibits them from electrification. National policy 
and planning guidelines for the electrification of unproclaimed areas stipulate that 
informal dwellings located on private, unstable land, within zones prohibited for 
development (such as flood plains and road or rail reserves) cannot be electrified. 
These households have either illegal connections or remain unelectrified. Huber 
(2015, p. 4) warns that “electricity networks not only reflect the uneven geographies 
of cities but actively reproduce them”. 
 
More significantly, there are many low-income households with connections whose 
supply was either interrupted or not affordable. As a consequence of people’s 
inability to access or afford electricity, people remain reliant on other, often ‘dirty’ 
fuels for some of their energy needs, usually for heating and/or cooking applications. 
Thus, the energy underclass is no longer defined as those without electricity 
connections, but now has expanded to include those who cannot afford to use this 
energy source. The energy expenditure burden for a poor household can be as 
much as 18 per cent of their household income (Winkler et al., 2011), compared to 
the 10 per cent norm set by the National Department of Energy (Kohler et al., 2009). 
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While connections to the electricity network have been impressive, the ability of 
Eskom1 to generate sufficient energy to meet these growing demands has been 
undermined by the government’s indecision over whether to privatise fully the sector 
(Jaglin and Dubresson, 2016, p.36-37). The post-apartheid political regime heralded 
a desire to extend market principles to former agencies, commissions or public 
enterprises and so change the state’s role in the nation’s system of accumulation 
and the MEC (Jaglin and Dubresson, 2016, p.21-22). So as to create appropriate 
conditions for privatisation/ neoliberalisation, the government introduced a 
moratorium on investment by Eskom in new generating capacity over the period 
2001-2004. The attempt to restructure the electricity distribution sector with the 
creation of six state-owned regional electricity distributors (REDs) failed in 2006 
because the reform had not given sufficient to the impact on the revenue streams of 
the municipalities (Jaglin, 2013; Swilling, 2014; Palmer, et al., 2017). The 
consequence of the moratorium was that, combined with an inadequate reserve 
margin during unscheduled maintenance operations, electricity generation by Eskom 
failed to keep pace with demand, which led to two outcomes.  
 
First, in circumstances were demand exceeds supply, the electricity grid can become 
unbalanced and trigger a complete black-out across the country that can take days 
to resolve. In order to mitigate against these occurrences, the practice of load-
shedding was adopted by Eskom in 2008, whereby defined areas experience 
outages of power for a specified period in order to maintain the stability of the 
                                            
1 Escom had become Eskom following the Electricity Act and Eskom Act of 1987. The main change 
introduced by this legislation was that, while remaining a commission, it was made responsible for its 
profits and losses. As a result, new investment was more carefully considered and its number of 
employees was reduced. Eskom itself became a public company (Eskom Holdings Limited) under the 
Eskom Conversion Act of 2001 (Baker, 2016) and had to comply with South African commercial law. 
It became a commercial state-owned enterprise (SOE). 
18 
 
system. However, the practice of load-shedding over the period 2008-2015 caused 
substantial reputational damage to Eskom. The shortages of supply have only been 
eased by a reduction in demand related to a decline in economic output and the 
effect of energy conservation measures.  
 
The second outcome of delayed investment in generation capacity was that, in order 
to finance new coal and nuclear power stations, significant price increases were 
experienced by customers. In Cape Town, for example, the price increases for 
electricity since 2006-07 have been in the range of 4.9 to 34.6 per cent., while the 
consumer price index has been in the range of 4.6 to 6.6 per cent (Table 3). As a 
result, it has been the low-income groups who have experienced the greatest rise in 
spending on electricity as a proportion of household income. These price increases 
have been absorbed more easily within high-income groups. While physical access 
to electricity might have improved, there are other factors, particularly ability to pay 
and affordability, that are now having a far more important influence on evaluations 
of the success of the electrification programme and definitions of the ‘energy 
underclass’.  
 
Alongside the electrification programme, the post-Apartheid regime introduced a 
range of energy-related pro-poor policies, where the disadvantaged are identified 
intentionally and offered access to a basic or minimum level of free service. Both the 
municipalities and Eskom have a role to operate these schemes, although Eskom 
appeared less willing to implement this support. The centrepiece of creating 
universal access to modern energy services is the Free Basic Electricity Tariff of 50 
KWh per month (if using less than 450 KWh per month) introduced in 2000 
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(Mohlakoana, 2014). The scheme is partly funded by the Local Government 
Equitable Share Grant from the National Treasury and, in cases of shortfalls, partly 
by surpluses generated by the municipalities’ sale of electricity (including for Eskom 
service areas within urban centres, who refuse to provide these pro-poor subsidies). 
In 2007, this support was extended to subsidise alternative energy services to 
households not connected to the national electricity grid through the Free Basic 
Alternative Energy in Rural Areas scheme, although not all municipalities have been 
able to implement the policy. The electricity consumption by the poor is also 
subsidised through an ‘Inclining Block Tariff System’ (IBTS), introduced in 2010, 
whereby charges increase with consumption. This system enables users with higher 
consumption rates to be charged at a higher rate and so facilitates cross-
subsidisation of the low-income groups charged at the lower rates. The higher 
charges for high consumption are also intended to promote energy conservation.  
 
These initiatives are, however, only a partial remedy in the task of resolving energy 
poverty. Many ‘indigent’ households, although eligible for FBE, have limited benefit 
from the policy as, in many cases, the 50 kWh per month subsidies do not benefit 
the poorest households (Franks and Prasad, 2014; Wolpe and Reddy, 2010). Free 
electricity up to 50 KWh per month provides only a small part of the energy needs of 
households and is often associated with a limited supply capacity (Bekker et al., 
2008, p.3132). While the scheme is promoted as being sufficient for basic lighting, 
television, radio, ironing and cooking needs, in reality, it is only enough to run 
household lighting (Ruiters, 2009, p.252). Ruiters (2009, p.260) argues that the FBE 
is pegged at a level that is too low and frugal to uplift the poor. It pressurises the 
poor to economise and, in doing so, acts to complicate everyday life. The ability to 
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pay ultimately restricts the use of electricity and causes the sustained use of ‘dirty’ 
and hazardous fuels.  
 
The high occurrence of informality also constrains many households from accessing 
FBE. Although some informal settlements have access to electricity, many do not, as 
municipalities are reluctant to sanction infrastructure on land which is not zoned for 
settlement within the city’s long-term spatial planning framework. Where electricity 
has been provided, an increase in the erection of illegal shacks in the backyards of 
formal houses in informal settlements has had implications for the distribution of 
FBE. Owners sell electricity to their tenants on an illegal basis and, consequently, 
many South Africans also lose their entitlement to 50 KWh of free electricity per 
month because their household’s meter is used by more than one household. Some 
meter owners sell their electricity to other users at a higher rate as a private money-
making venture, which can lead to a trebling of the cost of electricity for the 
purchasers (often ‘back-yard shack’ dwellers). Less common, but also reported, is 
that some households lose their formal subsidy through meter tampering and theft. 
Each meter can be connected to three additional users via the extra sockets on the 
box, which can then have the effect of taking the consumption for that meter above 
the minimum level and, in some cases, into the higher tariffs designed for the high 
consumption customers. Calculations by Franks (2014) illustrated that four 
households using 150 kWh per month would pay R212 per household on a shared 
meter, rather than R78 if each had been charged on a separate meter. The scheme 
can also be accessed by high income consumers with low energy consumption. 
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The IBTS has similar recognised limitations. Indeed, only 30 per cent of 
municipalities have adopted this system and many municipalities have not been 
convinced of the benefits to the poor (PDG, 2013). Where multiple poor households 
were using a single meter, which is often the case in townships, the combined 
consumption moved the charges into the more expensive tariffs. Very small 
differences in the bills charged by municipalities applying the IBTS and those that 
were not were demonstrated (Table 4). Such marginal benefits had been achieved at 
substantial cost and effort, together with considerable confusion to customers (PDG, 
2013). 
 
While significant progress has been achieved towards universal access to electricity 
supplies in urban South Africa during the post-apartheid period, the number of 
connections fails to convey a complete picture of the situation. Arguably, the ‘energy 
underclass’ is now composed of two groups. First, those who do not have physical 
access to the electricity network, which comprise 15 per cent of the population or 3.5 
million households in 2011, predominantly located in rural and informal areas. 
Second, there are households who have access to the network, but do not utilise the 
energy source because of cost or some other reason or set of circumstances. This 
second group might be more accurately described as the ‘energy vulnerable’, who 
experience socially and materially inadequate levels of domestic energy services 
because of a combination of socio-technical factors, such as income, prices, energy 
efficiency, the structural fabric of the building, tenure and legal constraints, and 
variations in infrastructure (Bouzarovski and Petrova, 2015). Such measures are not 
reflected in official energy data sources and highlights the need for more qualitative 
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research into the experiential dimensions of energy use in urban South Africa to 
provide firmer evidence for potential policy reform. 
 
5. Phase IV: Climate Change and renewable energy, 2011-present 
The emergence of the green agenda has the potential to introduce new processes 
and implications for the delivery of the brown and red agendas noted in the previous 
section, and so, once again, redefine the energy underclass. It could be also argued 
that some of the legacies of apartheid and the failure to resolve inequalities will make 
the achievement of green objectives much harder. As the ‘lion’s share’ of the 
country’s electricity is generated from cheap and dirty coal, its carbon emissions are 
high. South Africa is the 12th highest emitter of greenhouse gases in the world (SEA, 
2015) and has been a signatory to international agreements to reduce emissions, 
such as the Kyoto Protocol (2002) and the targets set by the Copenhagen Climate 
Change Conference (2009). Carbon dioxide emissions are to be reduced by 34 per 
cent by 2020 and by 43 per cent by 2025. South Africa’s Integrated Resource Plan 
(Department of Energy, 2011) set to increase the national electricity generation 
capacity from 41,000 MW to 89,532 MW by 2030, and which incorporated 23,559 
MW of grid-connected renewable energy (comprised 9,200 MW wind, 8,400 MW 
photovoltaics and 1,200 MW solar power) (Lombard and Ferreira, 2015; Baker, 
2016). The South African government’s support of renewable energy was, ironically, 
partly triggered by the load-shedding experienced since 2008, as well as external 
pressure about climate change from the international community. 
 
While the mix of renewable energy was projected to increase in this plan, so too was 
the new generation from coal-fired power stations, indicating that a genuine energy 
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transition is far from becoming a reality. The legitimising discourse based on the 
crisis of supply had been used simultaneously for the introduction of renewable 
energy as well as new coal-fired and nuclear power stations to meet existing 
demand (Baker, 2016). As Lombard and Ferreira (2015) suggest, despite the 
transformative potential of the IRP, it leaves Eskom’s business model unchallenged 
and might merely perpetuate high-carbon lock-in. The analysis of the Climate Action 
Tracker rates South Africa’s progress towards achieving carbon emissions 
reductions as ‘insufficient’. The rating further indicates that South Africa’s 
commitment is not consistent with a ’fair‘ approach to holding warming below 2°C, let 
alone with the Paris Agreement’s more stringent 1.5°C limit (Climate Action Tracker, 
2017). Nevertheless, the generation of energy from coal and nuclear power stations 
is needed to meet the immediate demand requirements to fulfil the brown and red 
agendas. It also illustrates the capacity constraints of renewable energy under the 
green agenda to service the demands of the brown and red agendas. 
 
There are two types of renewable energy generation in South Africa, which have the 
potential to create a post-networked electricity supply. First, there are the large-scale 
wind farms and solar arrays, which feed directly into the grid. In August, 2011, the 
South African government introduced the Renewable Energy Independent Producers 
Procurement Programme (RE IPPP), where independent power producers were 
invited to tender for licences to sell electricity to the Eskom grid under a 20-year 
purchase agreement. The bids were evaluated on the basis of price (70 per cent) 
and economic development potential (namely job creation, participation of 
disadvantaged populations, local environmental protection, rural development, 
community ownership and skills development: 30 per cent). By the end of the fourth 
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bid window in 2016, a total of 6,326 MW of procured renewable energy capacity had 
been created (Mushwana, et al., 2016, p.20).  
 
In addition to the amount of renewable energy generated from such projects, the 
scheme’s assessment of economic development potential as part of the bids are 
likely to produce positive effects in terms of employment opportunities and 
community ownership for those hosting the development locally (Tait, et al., 2013; 
Baker and Wlokas, 2015). The high quality regulatory framework and tough 
qualification criteria of this scheme has been praised internationally, although it 
proved complex and expensive for investors/developers, with high compliance costs 
(Baker and Wlokas, 2015, p.24). Most striking about the scheme is its community 
benefit requirements, which stipulates quantitative targets for socio-economic 
development, as well as a community shareholding threshold in new enterprises. 
This component of the scheme has resulted in the availability of around 11.5 billion 
Rand for community development2 (Wlokas, 2014). As communities eligible for 
support under this scheme are those within a 50 km radius of a project, 
geographically, these legacies will be clustered in areas of wind, solar, hydro or 
biomass capacity, which are usually located at some distance from urban centres. 
The current pattern of urbanisation does not match the geography of large-scale 
renewable energy resources. Communities in areas rich in renewable resources 
might be eligible for funding from multiple renewable energy projects, which can 
create problems of ensuring that the available development spend is in proportion to 
the scale of the community (Tait, et al., 2013, p.20). When the outcomes of the 
                                            
2 The value of 11.5 billion Rand was equivalent to approximately US$1.5 billion (based on exchange 
rates on 25 August, 2011, exchangerates.org.uk). 
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scheme become clearer over time, the fair distribution of the community benefits 
from such projects (ie the red agenda) are important issues to be investigated 
alongside the impacts on the green and brown agendas.  
 
The second type of renewable energy generation are small scale embedded 
generation schemes, where the electricity generated is used solely on site (Baker 
and Phillips, 2018). It is this second type that has the potential to resolve, accentuate 
or create new inequalities in a post-networked city. Renewable energy offers a form 
of decentralised generation, which, at least theoretically, is well suited to the 
sprawling and informal nature of much of the urbanisation in South Africa. 
International donor funded schemes for the generation of renewable energy in 
informal areas have had small-scale impact. Renewable energy technologies have 
the potential to generate electrical power for the remaining 3.4 m households, mainly 
in informal settlements, which are not on the grid. There are, nevertheless, 
considerable limitations to this prospect. Building structures in informal settlements, 
which are often no more than shacks, do not necessarily have the space or are 
capable of bearing the weight of a solar panel of sufficient size to generate a 
worthwhile amount of electricity. Solar Home Systems, for example, consist of a 
compact solar panel which can be installed on the roof, but is only sufficient to power 
a light, television and heater for a few hours per day. Larger panels can also be 
mounted on poles, but these are also then subject to the risk of theft and wind 
damage.  
 
Ultimately, however, the introduction of such systems, and the realisation of 
associated benefits, depends on the ability of households to pay for the technology 
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and its installation and maintenance. While middle to high income groups and 
businesses might have the resources to afford such an investment to improve their 
access to power, low income and poor groups do not necessarily have the same 
options. The perpetuation of an ‘energy underclass’ appears to be a real likelihood 
from the sustainable energy transition (Bickerstaff, et al., 2013, p.5).  
 
There are also other potential implications for the poor of small-scale embedded 
generation related to the electricity distribution model operating in South Africa. As 
the municipalities’ pro-poor policies are partly funded by the profits made from the 
distribution of electricity, the adoption of small-scale embedded renewable energy 
generation by high-consumption consumers would undermine this funding model. 
Two significant effects might be created. First, the loss of revenue from reduced 
sales of electricity to high-consumption users would affect the ability of municipalities 
to cross-subsidise the tariffs of the existing poor consumers. Ultimately, these 
pressures might lead to a reduction in minimum service levels. The ability of local 
government to contribute to the brown and red agendas would be affected 
detrimentally, even if the green agenda is progressed. This ‘hidden funding gap’ is 
likely to affect the ability of municipalities to continue current practices without 
considerable restructuring of the organisations and/or redefinition of service levels. 
Second, it would question the financial sustainability of further extending the 
electrification programme for those populations still not connected to the grid, 
including the growing number of new in-migrant households forming in informal 
settlements. Both effects would undermine the welfare goal to reduce inequalities in 
society. 
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6. Discussion  
The aim of this paper was to examine the development of South Africa’s versions of 
the modern infrastructural ideal and energy transition for electricity provision since 
1860, together with the changing balance of the brown, red and green agendas and 
the associated effects on the ‘energy underclass’ in urban South Africa. The results 
presented above show that the agendas are in conflict in certain configurations and 
that the composition and definition of the energy underclass has changed with each 
transition.  
 
In the first phase of electrification, during the emergence of the electricity system that 
fed the MEC, all but a few of the population comprised the energy underclass. 
Energy was predominantly supplied in cities and towns with mining operations and 
industry. No green, brown or red agendas were pursued at this time. Under 
apartheid, the second phase of electrification identified in this paper, a rather 
distorted version of the modern infrastructural ideal formed, whereby ‘universal’ 
electricity was supplied to white areas only and the energy underclass of non-whites 
were defined by a disconnection from the centralised network influenced by systems 
from the global north. The apartheid period was characterised by the provision of 
electricity to the white population only, with the energy underclass clearly defined as 
the non-white population. As with the first phase of electrification, none of the 
agendas applied during this period. 
 
The post-apartheid era, which constituted the third phase of electrification, has 
positioned universal access to electricity as a central element of the creation of a 
more equitable and democratic society, encompassing the brown and red agendas. 
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This policy goal has been implemented through two main mechanisms: first, by the 
roll-out of an extensive distribution grid by the national electricity generator, Eskom, 
with municipalities; and second, by the implementation of pro-poor policies by a 
‘developmental’ local government to ensure that electrical energy is affordable to the 
population. The extent to which these initiatives have been successful is debateable 
and many studies have shown that there is a considerable energy underclass that 
cannot access or afford to use electricity for their cooking, lighting and heating 
needs. Instead, they rely on multiple sources of energy, including ‘dirty’ fuels which 
are harmful to human health (Musango, 2014; Knox et al., 2017). In these 
circumstances, the energy underclass is defined by their inability to pay for energy 
use and remains predominantly black in composition, especially as the cost of 
electricity rises to fund new generation capacity. 
 
Phase four is being dominated by the emergence of the green agenda to national 
policy in the form of a low carbon transition and, through new technologies, the 
prospect of a post-networked electricity supply. Since 2008, this agenda has 
introduced new dynamics and implications for universal electricity distribution and 
the affordability of those services. Most notably, the emergence of the green agenda 
has affected the ability to deliver the goals of the red and brown agendas. The 
generation of renewable energy has the potential to reduce the ability of 
municipalities to cross-subsidise the tariffs of the existing poor consumers as well as 
fund capital expenditure to extend the grid. Furthermore, while decentralised forms 
of renewable energy have the potential to reach populations that are presently not 
serviced by the electricity grid, the technology might also diminish the ability of 
municipalities to cross-subsidise their pro-poor policies because of the loss of high-
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consumption consumers to embedded generation (SEA, 2014; Carter, 2015). Low 
income and poor groups do not have the resources to benefit from this new 
technology. In these circumstances, the energy underclass is likely to be redefined 
once more, but in ways that are not possible to specify with any precision at this 
point in time. The emergence of a new pathway based, however loosely, on 
renewable energy and more decentralised forms of generation and distribution of the 
post-networked city is not, therefore, an ideologically or spatially neutral project.  
 
7. Conclusion and policy implications 
While the transferability of urban models and the limitations of anticipating future 
energy demands and uses should be recognised (Shove and Walker, 2014), this 
discussion has raised a number of policy implications, which have relevance to both 
the South African context and the wider international community. First, the need for a 
more integrative approach to energy policy in South Africa has been demonstrated. 
What is clear from this essentially historical review is that the agendas influencing 
the generation, distribution and consumption of electricity in South Africa are multiple 
and deeply conflicted. While there is scope for some positive synergies between the 
agendas, the achievement of the green energy targets are unlikely because of the 
legacy of profound energy inequality that has not been addressed to a sufficient 
extent. It is perhaps necessary to have advanced considerably further with the brown 
and red agendas before anything meaningful can done about the green agenda. A 
focus on the interconnections between the brown, red and green agendas might lead 
to a more integrated approach, where the agendas are better aligned and would 
enhance the delivery of electricity services to the benefit of all citizens in South 
Africa, whilst mitigating the effects of climate change.   
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As each new agenda has been emerged over time, no fundamental reorganisation of 
the system has taken place, which has allowed established vested interests to hinder 
progressive change. The apparent lack of political will to reform Eskom has been 
cited as a real challenge to energy transitions (McDaid, 2009). A more integrative 
approach to both the management of energy systems and the formulation of policy 
across multiple levels of governance, including at municipal and national levels as 
well as between public and private entities, appears to be needed. In particular, 
integration between the green and brown agendas is at present severely lacking. For 
example, although the FBE policy has a clear potential to provide a bridge between 
pro-poor energy provision and decarbonisation of the energy supply (for example, by 
supplying decentralised energy systems to indigent households), the two remain 
largely separate in official energy governance spheres. A fundamental component of 
achieving this integration therefore lies in the establishment of appropriate 
governance structures in the energy sector. 
 
Second, it is clear that the modern infrastructure ideal of the networked city has 
shaped energy systems in the global north may not be the most appropriate way to 
achieve access to clean, affordable and equitable access to modern energy in the 
global south. Local and international conditions shape national and sub-national 
energy and development policies as well as the configuration of local and national 
electricity systems, which then influence the delivery of the brown, green and red 
agendas in a particular locality. The recognition that a centralised energy grid may 
not be appropriate to local circumstances has significant policy implications for South 
Africa and countries that are facing similar energy access and poverty issues within 
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their transition to low-carbon societies. The importance of understanding the local 
context is therefore fundamental to the effective transferability of the models of a 
centralised grid (which might be suited to urban areas), a mini-grid (for remote areas 
with relatively high population density), decentralised generation (for stand-alone 
systems in remote areas or informal areas), and/or any combination thereof. 
 
Other African nations often look to South Africa, as the region’s most advanced 
economy and energy system, for guidance on energy-related issues. However, the 
high costs of grid-electrification create a situation where the majority of Africans 
remain without adequate access to energy, and both energy access targets and 
climate change commitments remain unfulfilled. South Africa’s REIPPP model, which 
is hailed as an international model of renewable energy procurement, is often copied 
uncritically by other countries, but might replicate some of South Africa’s problems in 
other geographical areas. Furthermore, by understanding the electrification of South 
Africa, other nations may be able to ‘leap-frog’ any issues experienced. For example, 
other African countries could implement and adapt those policies that are likely to be 
transferable to the new policy context, whilst mitigating for the known side effects of 
interventions in local circumstances. 
 
Third, international energy policy must recognise that, whatever the causes and local 
variations, the potential uneven and differentiated urban spatial effects of a 
sustainable energy transition will be integral to the planning and management of 
such transformations. It is clear that measures of energy poverty defined by 
connection (or not) to the electricity network are no longer adequate in defining the 
‘energy underclass’. A range of circumstances and factors affecting a household’s 
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ability to secure adequate energy services are now recognised in terms of energy 
poverty and ‘energy vulnerability’ (Bouzarovski and Petrova, 2015), which are not 
always captured in official data sources. There is a need for research into the energy 
vulnerability of the urban poor and the experiential dimensions of energy use to 
better frame policy interventions.  
 
Fourth, the potential threat to the budgets of the municipalities’ pro-poor energy 
initiatives from small-scale embedded generation from renewable energy requires an 
alternative funding model so that brown, red and green agendas can advance. One 
proposal is for the introduction of standing charges for households with a SSEG to 
cover the cost of maintenance of connections to compensate for the reduced income 
from the lower consumption of energy. Another option might be to fully fund pro-poor 
energy policies by the national exchequer rather than as a system partly dependent 
on surpluses from the sale of electricity by municipalities in each local area.  
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Table 1.  Inter-relationships between the political, technological and institutional dynamics of electricity generation 
and distribution in South Africa, 1950-2019 
 
Period Political Technological Institutional 
1860-
1948 
Emergence of national industrial 
strategy based on MEC 
dependent upon cheap electricity 
and labour.  
 
Generation of electricity from 
cheap coal and hydro 
sources. Limited distribution 
capacity 
Private companies generated power for mining 
operations. Municipalities generated own power 
for public spaces in town and city centres, which 
later extended to businesses and residential areas. 
Creation of Eskom in 1926 to pool and distribute 
low cost electricity. 
1948-
1994 
Apartheid era: overt forms of 
racial segregation and exclusion 
created highly segregated urban 
forms (well-serviced white areas 
were geographically separated 
from poorly serviced black 
townships). 
Plentiful supply of electricity 
from cheap coal (and later 
nuclear power). 
Eskom: effective in generating cheap and plentiful 
electricity as a central feature of the 
industrialisation of the country within the ‘Minerals-
Energy Complex’.  
Local government: Many urban municipalities 
generated and distributed their own electricity to 
white areas only. Bantustans/homelands for black 
populations and elected councils for black 
townships (after 1982) had limited ‘parastatal’ 
electricity providers.  
1994-
2011 
Post-apartheid: pro-poor policies 
to reduce inequalities in society.  
Plentiful supply of electricity 
from cheap coal and nuclear 
power until 2007. Then 
shortages in the generation 
capacity requiring load-
shedding.  
Eskom: Retained distribution of electricity to rural 
areas and some parts of cities, and merged with 
Homeland electricity parastatals. Failed 
government attempts to privatise the sector 
resulted in a lack of investment in generation 
capacity, 1998-2004, creating the load-shedding 
crisis, 2008-2015.  
Local government: Municipalities given a 
‘developmental’ role in the new Constitution, 
including the distribution or reticulation of electricity 
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in urban areas with cross-subsidisation of poor 
populations, especially in townships. Municipalities 
in urban areas were able to build on their existing 
functions and competencies from the apartheid era, 
while townships, rural and homeland areas had to 
build from a low or non-existent base. 
2011- Climate change agenda and 
renewable energy. Government 
pledges to reduce carbon 
emissions by 34 per cent by 2020 
and 42 per cent by 2025 
(Copenhagen Climate Change 
Conference, 2009).  
Shortages in generation 
capacity encouraged 
investment in two new coal-
burning power stations and 
nuclear power as well as 
renewable energy, especially 
wind and solar. 
Eskom: After 2004, the ban on Eskom investing in 
new generation capacity was lifted, but then 
suffered from a lack of expertise and 
mismanagement of the development of that new 
capacity, 2010-. The rising cost of new investment 
required increases in the cost of electricity to 
consumers. In the Integrated Resource Plan of 
2010, the Government encouraged independent 
power producers for the generation of renewable 
energy. 
Local government: Some municipalities formulate 
climate change strategies as an additional duty 
alongside its pro-poor obligations. The effect of 
small-scale embedded renewable energy as a form 
of decentralised generation is recognised as a 
potential threat to the financial viability of pro-poor 
subsidised energy provision. 
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Table 2. Use of energy Services for households in South Africa, 
1996-2011 
Energy/fuel for Lighting 
Census Year 1996 % 2001 % 2011 % 
Electricity 5220825 57.63 7815270 69.74 12242401 84.72 
Gas 35512 0.39 27065 0.24 34347 0.24 
Paraffin 1144014 12.63 759817 6.78 426205 2.95 
Candles 2583031 28.51 2545532 22.72 1649082 11.41 
Solar 0 0.00 24175 0.22 51505 0.36 
Other 800 0.01 33845 0.30 0 0.00 
None 0 0.00 0 0.00 46621 0.32 
Unspecified 75389 0.83 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Total 9059571 100 11205705 100.00 14450161 100.00 
 
Energy/fuel for Heating 
Census Year 1996 % 2001 % 2011 % 
Electricity 4030850 44.49 5493021 49.02 8503109 58.84 
Gas 107689 1.19 124982 1.12 357062 2.47 
Paraffin 1294964 14.29 1641458 14.65 1230223 8.51 
Wood 2417724 26.69 2758861 24.62 2203384 15.25 
Coal 735632 8.12 734455 6.55 293949 2.03 
Animal dung 84447 0.93 83058 0.74 48251 0.33 
Solar 0 0.00 23509 0.21 38370 0.27 
Other 5828 0.06 346361 3.09 2442 0.02 
None 0 0.00 0 0.00 1773372 12.27 
Unspecified 382438 4.22 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Total 9059571 100.00 11205705 100.00 14450161 100.00 
 
Energy/fuel for Cooking 
Census Year 1996 % 2001 % 2011 % 
Electricity 4265306 47.08 5761354 51.41 10675094 73.88 
Gas 286657 3.16 284295 2.54 507616 3.51 
Paraffin 1943862 21.46 2394919 21.37 1227337 8.49 
Wood 2073219 22.88 2292674 20.46 1807606 12.51 
Coal 320830 3.54 310059 2.77 104171 0.72 
Animal dung 106068 1.17 110969 0.99 45349 0.31 
Solar 0 0.00 24225 0.22 22255 0.15 
Other 987 0.01 27210 0.24 29344 0.20 
None 0 0.00 0 0.00 31390 0.22 
Unspecified 62641 0.69 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Total 9059571 100.00 11205705 100.00 14450161 100.00 
 
SOURCE: StatsSA SuperWeb2 
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Table 3.  Average percentage increases in City of Cape Town and Eskom 
electricity prices relative to increases in consumer price index (as 
published in Eskom tariff history document) 
 
Year City Eskom CPI 
2006-07 4.9 5.1 4.6 
2007-08 5.6 5.9 5.2 
2008-09 34.6 27.5 6.6 
2009-10 33.4 31.3 6.16 
2010-11 24.6 24.8 5.4 
2011-12 19.9 25.8 4.5 
2012-13 11.0 16.0 5.7 
2013-14 7.9 8.0 6.0 
 
SOURCE: City of Cape Town (2015, p.85). 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.  Effect of IBTS on household charges 
 
Households Effect of IBTS on charges 
Low income households 
(R1600 income per month using 
200KWh per month) 
R2 lower 
Middle income households (R12800 
income per month using 500KWh per 
month) 
R90 lower 
High income households (R51200 
income per month using 1000 KWh per 
month) 
R5 higher 
 
SOURCE: PDG (2013) 
 
 
